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NO. 31 JUNE 2020 Introduction 
Beyond the Green Deal: Upgrading the 
EU’s Energy Diplomacy for a New Era 
Maria Pastukhova, Jacopo Pepe and Kirsten Westphal 
The Green Deal launched by the new Commission in 2019 is set to profoundly reshape 
the European Union (EU)’s energy diplomacy. However, although the EU will have to 
adapt to the new policy direction determined by the Green Deal, it cannot be reduced 
to it. The EU’s energy diplomacy will need to cope with the profound and various 
geo-economic and geopolitical shifts set in motion by the energy transition, which in-
clude – but even transcend – the Green Deal’s goals. The current EU Energy Diplomacy 
Action Plan is due for revision. In setting the new priorities, the Union will need to 
strike a balance between global aspirations and limited financial means. The upcom-
ing German EU Presidency is being called to step up its efforts to upgrade the EU’s 
energy diplomacy along three lines. First, review the existing set of priorities accord-
ing to the new challenges. Second, expand the geographic radius of its actions beyond 
its direct neighborhood by focusing on 12 anchor partners along the Afro-Eur-Asian 
ellipse. Third, upgrade its instruments toolbox along five new areas of action, avoid-
ing an exclusively normative-ideological approach in favor of a more realistic and 
country-tailored one. 
 
The EU’s priorities are changing: In 2019, 
the Von der Leyen Commission launched 
the European Green Deal Communication, 
which aims to make Europe the first cli-
mate-neutral continent by 2050. This was 
followed by the Next Generation Recovery 
Plan in May 2020 in response to the Covid-
19 pandemic. 
These policy moves inevitably affect 
the EU’s foreign policy, as it explicitly talks 
about the European continent and envi-
sions the EU as the global leader that will 
carry the Green Deal agenda to the rest of 
the world. The external dimension of the 
EU’s energy policy – implemented within 
the framework of the EU’s Energy Diploma-
cy Action Plan, introduced in 2015 – will 
have to adapt accordingly. 
Traditionally focused on securing access 
to the supply of fossil fuels and strengthen-
ing multilateral energy governance, as 
defined in the 2015 Action Plan, the EU’s 
energy diplomacy will in fact not only have 
to adapt to the new policy direction deter-
mined by the Green Deal, but also to the 
profound geo-economic and geopolitical 
shifts that have been set in motion – not 
least – by the (diverse) energy transition(s) 
SWP Comment 31 
June 2020 
2 
around the globe. These shifts are driven by 
new strategic technologies and value chains 
around renewable energy sources; by pro-
duction, trade, and transport of (clean) gases 
e.g. hydrogen and its downstream products, 
batteries and modern storage technologies; 
by greater digitalization of energy system(s); 
by increased electrification of economies 
as a consequence of both energy transitions 
and the new industrial revolution (Industry 
4.0); by cross-border power-grid intercon-
nections and new “grid communities”; by 
changing dynamics in the financial and in-
vestment landscape. 
Furthermore, alternative (and competing) 
visions for the future energy system are 
being pushed by powers such as China and 
the United States. This affects not only global 
transformation processes, but also estab-
lished partnerships – both within the EU 
and with third countries, ultimately erod-
ing multilateral energy governance mecha-
nisms in favor of economic fragmentation 
and technological-normative competition. 
Finally, in recent months there has been 
an added challenge that has already pro-
foundly affected European and global 
energy systems and will have long-lasting 
repercussions in the years to come – the 
crisis related to the outbreak of Covid-19. 
As we can already see from slumping global 
oil prices as well as gas and power prices on 
the European market, the corona crisis will 
not only affect the stability of economies 
that are dependent on the export of fossil 
fuels, but also the European energy indus-
try. Aside from this immediate shock, mid-
term effects on the global scale include the 
disruption of wind and solar value chains; 
the draining of investment flows in the 
energy sector; delays in the construction of 
critical infrastructure and renewable power-
generation facilities; profound changes in 
consumption behavior; the rapid and un-
controlled digitalization of the energy sec-
tor; and additional health damage caused 
by the lack of access to clean cooking fuels 
for people on lockdown (e.g., India). In view 
of these – and potentially many more – 
challenges to emerge from the corona crisis, 
moving toward sustainable and resilient 
energy systems has become an even more 
pressing and formidable issue. 
Given the processes under way, the 
EU’s energy diplomacy will face a complex 
test of balancing climate, industrial, trade, 
development, as well as energy and security 
policies – in bi-, pluri-, and multilateral 
formats. 
Strategic Priorities for the 
Transition Era 
Against this backdrop, the EU will first need 
to reformulate its energy diplomacy along a 
few clear strategic priorities; second, on this 
basis, to identify a set of key countries to (re-) 
engage with; and third, to redefine its instru-
ments toolbox according to both its stra-
tegic priorities and the identified partners. 
To this end, we propose the following – 
revised – set of five priorities for the EU’s 
new energy diplomacy. 
1) As competing visions and regulatory 
frameworks for the future energy system 
emerge and multiply, the first imperative 
for the EU will be to strengthen its position as 
a norm- and standard-setter on energy transition, 
promoting transparent cooperation mecha-
nisms for technical and regulatory matters. 
2) Considering the increasingly competi-
tive geo-economic environment – includ-
ing competition over market share, control 
of new technologies, and new value and 
supply chains – the second priority of 
the EU’s new energy diplomacy will be to 
strengthen and enhance economic opportunities 
for European businesses. These will have to be 
tested particularly in the established and 
emerging renewable energy markets and in 
new low-carbon and digital technologies. 
3) Increasing the security and stability of both 
energy supplies and energy systems will be an-
other priority. The traditional focus on the 
security of fossil fuel supplies, particularly 
gas, will remain a relevant goal during 
the transition, even under changed market 
conditions. However, given the systemic 
nature of the new challenges and shifts 
under way, the focus on security and sta-
bility will now need to be expanded to cover 
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not only fossil fuels, but also electricity and 
low- and carbon-neutral fuels, e.g., hydro-
gen and its downstream products, as well as 
the raw materials central for the manufac-
ture of storage and renewable power-gen-
eration equipment. Furthermore, its scope 
should be broadened to encompass social 
and political stability, not only of the EU 
but of neighboring countries and those that 
are particularly vulnerable to these shifts 
(e.g., petrostates, politically volatile coun-
tries). Even if the nurturing of energy rela-
tions is not the silver bullet for the chal-
lenges faced by these countries, it can give 
the EU leverage to contribute toward their 
political and social stability. 
4) The fourth priority should be support-
ing the energy transition in third countries 
and regions by addressing the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goal on energy (SDG 7) to ensure access 
to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and 
modern energy for all. 
5) Finally, in line with the Green Deal 
and in order to strengthen the international 
system, it is necessary to achieve success 
within one of the few multilateral coopera-
tion mechanisms on energy and climate – 
the Paris Agreement. 
There is, of course, an inherent dilemma 
in view of the global scope of these challenges 
on the one hand, and the EU’s limited politi-
cal and financial resources on the other. 
An overstretching of ambitions needs to be 
avoided, also for the sake of managing expec-
tations in the respective partner countries. 
The scale and scope of the EU’s efforts will 
have to be reconsidered and reinvented as 
well. 
Remapping the EU’s 
Energy Partners 
The EU will have to reorder its priorities 
regarding partner countries and regions: 
Given the global nature of the systemic shifts 
taking place in the energy landscape, the 
traditional focus on the European “neigh-
borhood” will not suffice. Since the capacity 
to widen the scope of the EU’s energy diplo-
macy efforts is not limitless, a prioritization 
of prospective countries of interest (anchor 
partners) is required. While creating the new 
map of anchor partnerships for EU energy 
diplomacy, the following questions must be 
addressed. What “historic” energy partner-
ships will remain, and how are they to be 
modified? What will change in the dynam-
ics and formats of future cooperation? What 
new partnerships must be aspired to in the 
era of transformation of the energy system? 
What will the toolbox for the EU’s new 
energy diplomacy look like? 
Identifying the anchor partners in the 
regions is strategically relevant for the EU’s 
energy diplomacy. The strategic importance 
of the countries in question is derived from 
the five priorities listed above, and from the 
declared interests of the respective coun-
tries to cooperate with the EU and associate 
themselves with the European energy and 
climate agenda. 
Norway, the United Kingdom, and the 
Balkans are all members of the EU’s regu-
latory space and/or the European Economic 
Area, and are viewed therefore as natural 
partners. The world’s three biggest econo-
mies and the most influential players when 
it comes to shaping global energy markets as 
well as normative and regulatory spaces – 
the United States, China, and Japan – have 
been deliberately left out here. The global 
impact of China and the United States is 
massive in every respect. While formulating 
and executing its energy diplomacy, the EU 
will in any case have to come to terms with 
the worldviews that these two countries are 
exporting. On the one side, there are China’s 
expansionist investments in critical infra-
structure, its “no normative strings attached” 
policy combined with the proclivity to co-
operate with non-democratic regimes, as 
well as the attempts to create alternative – 
or transform existing – multilateral gov-
ernance structures. On the other side, there 
is the isolationist attitude of the United 
States and the tendency to renounce multi-
lateralism in favor of national interests 
with its “energy dominance” strategy. Japan, 
in its turn, puts its stake on multilateral 
norms-based energy governance and could 
prove to be a crucial global ally for the EU’s 
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energy diplomacy, despite partially compet-
ing industrial interests. 
Furthermore, the selection of the anchor 
partners is intentionally focused on Afro-
Eur-Asia, given that the geopolitical shifts 
set in motion by the global energy transi-
tion(s) are particularly pronounced on this 
greater continental space. While focusing 
its main efforts on the countries listed 
in the section below, the EU should main-
tain its dialogue and engagement in Latin 
America, which is one of the most dynamic 
regions when it comes to pursuing energy 
transition goals, among them the deploy-
ment of renewables and energy efficiency. 
The countries in the region remain not only 
top destinations for renewable investments 
among emerging markets (Brazil, Argen-
tina), and central for strategic raw materials 
for renewable value chains (Chile), but 
also important players in the multilateral 
governance fora, most importantly within 
the G20. 
Prioritizing and Re-engaging Coun-
tries in the Afro-Eur-Asian Ellipse 
The upgraded set of priorities of the EU’s 
energy diplomacy serves as a starting 
point that allows for identifying a set of 
12 anchor partners who are geographically 
located in an Afro-Eur-Asian ellipse – a 
more or less contiguous space that both 
includes and transcends the immediate 
neighborhood in the east and the south. 
A flexible, less ideological, and more 
partner-tailored engagement will allow the 
EU’s new energy diplomacy to effectively 
create a balance between the global scope 
and scale of its efforts and its (limited) 
means. The countries are ranked according 
to their relevance along the five priorities 
identified earlier. The ranking was con-
ducted based on the weighted scoring of the 
countries’ performance levels in relation to 
the five priorities of the EU, combined with 
the qualitative assessments of the authors 
regarding their predisposition to coopera-
tion on energy-transition issues and their 
general strategic relevance. 
On the one side, the results single out 
countries where cooperation with the EU 
on energy issues already exists and is well-
established (e.g., EU-India, EU-Algeria, and 
EU-Egypt energy dialogues). On the other 
side, they call either for a profound rethink-
ing of the existing formats and instruments 
– since some partnerships, particularly 
those with Russia and Ukraine, are tailored 
in line with the EU’s traditional focus on 
security of supply – or for a much greater 
and substantial engagement with countries 
that have been marginalized in the EU’s 
energy diplomacy, such as Saudi Arabia, 
the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, and 
Uzbekistan. 
India is a strategically important partner 
for regulatory and normative cooperation. 
It plays a central role in the Paris Agree-
ment as it is the third-biggest emitter of 
CO2. The country plans to reduce the inten-
sity of its GDP emissions by 35 percent com-
pared to 2005 levels and to increase the 
share of its non-fossil power-generation 
capacity to 40 percent (or 450 GW) by 2030. 
The country offers a favorable climate for 
foreign investments combined with the 
need to satisfy the growing energy demand. 
Clean cooking and access to electricity can 
be leveraged to support sustainable devel-
opment. 
Geopolitically, Ukraine is of strategic 
importance in the neighborhood. It has 
declared willingness to conform to the EU’s 
Green Deal and the EU’s internal energy 
market. Ukraine is both a conventional 
transit partner and a future energy partner 
within the synchronized power system of 
continental Europe under the operation 
of ENTSO-E, but also for production, trans-
port and storage of clean gases as well as 
in energy efficiency. Ukraine’s regulatory 
framework is increasingly supportive of 
renewable energy sources. 
Egypt is in a strategic geographic posi-
tion in the Afro-Eur-Asian ellipse as a gas 
and electricity hub, and thus important for 
the EU’s norm- and standard-setting posi-
tion. It is a promising partner for Europe, 
because of its growing industrial sector, 
its home market of 98 million people, its 
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rapidly increasing electricity demand, 
its ambitious targets for renewables, and its 
plans to increase energy-efficiency levels. 
The industrial base (wind, PV and CSP tech-
nology) and the regulatory framework offer 
great chances for European business. 
Russia is the EU’s major energy supplier 
and its biggest neighbor. Thus, the country 
will be heavily affected by EU’s decarboni-
zation. Managing the impact of the transi-
tion and cooperating with Russia in renew-
ables, methane leakage and hydrogen, and 
energy-efficiency measures could not only 
contribute to the stability of the Russian 
economy, but also co-opt Russia for a 
greener future and help it sustain its com-
mitment to the Paris Agreement. Russia 
is an important partner for a dialogue on 
technical and regulatory matters – as a 
norm- and standard-setter in the Eurasian 
Economic Union. 
Turkey is synchronized with the Euro-
pean continental grid and a major gas tran-
sit country to the EU. It is in a geostrategic 
position as a bridge between Europe and 
Asia, to the Caucasus and the Middle East, 
and to the East Mediterranean. The shared 
areas of regulatory cooperation with the 
EU are numerous, ranging from technology 
transfer, norms and standards in renew-
ables, and energy efficiency to further liber-
alization of the power market. Turkey is 
part of the EU Customs Union and offers a 
favorable environment for economic coope-
ration on energy efficiency and clean tech-
nologies. 
Algeria, a major oil and gas supplier to 
the EU, will be heavily affected by the EU’s 
decarbonization. The need for Algeria to 
adapt might open up chances for coopera-
tion with the EU on the yet-to-be-realized 
energy market reforms, energy-savings 
measures, and the planned, ambitious RE 
projects and targets. Algeria is an important 
anchor partner in terms of regional power 
grid integration, but also regarding eco-
nomic cooperation on energy-efficiency 
technology and wind-power value chains. 
Morocco is synchronized with the Euro-
pean continental grid and intends to be-
come a regional electricity hub. Its vast RE 
potential and favorable regulatory frame-
Figure 
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work make it an attractive market for Euro-
pean RE technology, particularly for wind 
and parabolic trough CSP, but also for elec-
trolysers. Given that the amount of invest-
ments and technology transfer from Chinese 
and Gulf companies in the RE sector is 
growing, the EU needs to step up its pres-
ence there. Finally, Morocco’s emission 
and renewable targets are ambitious, and 
among the few nationally determined con-
tributions found to be compatible with 
the Paris Agreement goals. 
Although Indonesia is one of the key 
manufacturing bases for RE technology in 
East Asia, it still lacks its own low-carbon 
capacities. Its economic potential in the 
sphere of RE and energy efficiency is mas-
sive, but it is short on investments and does 
not have a transparent regulatory frame-
work. Looking at the Paris Agreement, the 
EU should consider how to provide support 
to this major CO2 emitter and one of the 
most populous countries in the world while 
helping it to achieve its ambitious goal of a 
41 percent reduction in emissions by 2040 
compared to business as usual scenario. 
Saudi Arabia, the world’s biggest oil-
exporting country, is aiming for an energy 
transition to balance the economic diver-
sification of sustainable development meas-
ures with stability. In its Vision 2030, Riadh 
is betting big the development of a circular 
carbon economy, RE technology and value-
chain development and on energy-efficiency 
measures. Saudi Arabia is also key for the 
creation of a regional electricity market. 
This all creates opportunities for EU busi-
ness and calls for the EU to strengthen regu-
latory and economic cooperation. 
Kazakhstan – along with Uzbekistan – 
will be a crucial anchor partner for the EU 
in Central Asia to solve trans-border water 
and energy issues as well as to favor regional 
grid (re)integration and the trade in elec-
tricity. The country is aiming at economic 
diversification and encouraging FDI in the 
RE manufacturing sector, thus opening up 
chances for European business. As Kazakh-
stan is the second most important member 
of the Eurasian Economic Union and a key 
target of Chinese investments in RE in Cen-
tral Asia, the EU partnership with the coun-
try will be crucial for promoting EU norms 
and standards in the region. 
Uzbekistan will prove essential for in-
creasing regional energy cooperation (reac-
tivation of the Central Asian Power System, 
water–energy nexus) and stability. The 
announced electricity market reforms and 
recent diplomatic openness offer a good 
basis for regulatory and economic coopera-
tion with the EU, while high energy-inten-
sity, growing energy demand, and rapid 
economic growth increase the potential for 
RE and energy efficiency. Unreliable elec-
tricity supply to rural areas and repeated 
power blackouts make cooperation with 
the EU essential. 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged 
as a frontrunner, both in advancing the 
global energy-transition discussion (the coun-
try hosts the International Renewable Energy 
Agency, IRENA) and as an investor in re-
newable energy. The UAE supports regional 
grid integration. It is a potential valuable 
partner for the EU in exporting technology 
standards, investing in regional and global 
value chains, and reinforcing global energy 
discussion fora. 
Upgrading the EU’s Energy 
Diplomacy Toolbox 
The selection of the 12 anchor partners 
across the Afro-Eur-Asian space is a first and 
necessary step toward redefining the geo-
graphic radius of action of the EU’s new 
energy diplomacy amid limited means and 
rapidly mounting global challenges. In addi-
tion, this diplomacy will have to further 
adjust its existing set of instruments in line 
with the identified priorities. 
By doing so, however, the EU cannot 
afford a strictly norm-based “one-size-fits-
all” approach, nor can it reduce its actions 
to the external promotion of, and compli-
ance with, the Green Deal. On the contrary, 
the high levels of versatility regarding the 
political situations of the identified anchor 
partners, their different energy transition 
agendas, and their distinct approaches to 
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climate change call for a more flexible and 
differentiated toolbox. This toolbox should 
ideally consolidate and repackage many of 
the already existing instruments along the 
following five revised areas of action and 
operationalize them as follows. 
1) Normative-regulatory exchange and 
transfer. In this area, which includes energy 
market reforms, network codes and tariffs, 
technical standards and certificates, and 
renewable energy as well as legislation for 
clean gases, currently existing instruments 
such as high-level bilateral energy dialogues 
and partnerships need to be adjusted to 
include dialogue and exchanges on tech-
nical and regulatory matters at the working 
level. These should go beyond generic 
declarations and Memorandums of Under-
standing, become binding for both sides, 
and be equipped with step-by-step imple-
mentation monitoring. Though the fora for 
such cooperation already partly exist, they 
are not strategically used. It is imperative to 
have a continuous exchange between trans-
mission operators and regulators at EU level 
(ENTSO-E/G and ACER), and its counterparts 
in the countries connected to – or willing 
to conform to – the EU’s power market 
(TEİAŞ and EMRA in Turkey, Ukrenergo and 
NEURC in Ukraine, ONEE and ANRE in 
Morocco, etc.) and gas markets. In addition, 
regulatory exchange with the counterpart 
regional institutions, such as MEDREG or 
the Energy Department of the Eurasian 
Economic Commission (EAEU), is of high 
relevance. Additional instruments for 
enabling and strengthening the exchange 
and transfer of clean technologies must 
become part of future energy partnerships, 
among them the creation of new joint 
research programs and clusters of excel-
lence; the training of skilled personnel/ 
manufacturers; cooperation on licensing 
and industrial property rights; and creating 
bi- and multilateral frameworks for sup-
porting research spinoffs of the most 
promising technologies. 
2) Seizing market opportunities in 
global and regional low-carbon-energy 
value and supply chains. This area applies 
to several of the identified countries (India, 
Egypt, Morocco, Russia, Uzbekistan, Indo-
nesia, and to a certain extent Turkey). Here, 
existing energy dialogues and partnerships 
will not suffice. Moreover, the EU’s new 
energy diplomacy should more decisively 
act to include energy-sector-specific pro-
visions when negotiating or renegotiating 
Association Agreements, Deep and Com-
prehensive Free Trade Areas, Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements, and Preferen-
tial Trade Agreements in order to secure 
access to emerging local and regional pro-
duction networks. Second, as many Euro-
pean companies, particularly in the low-
carbon sector, are small and medium-sized 
enterprises, a greater involvement of, and 
coordination with, European Chambers of 
Commerce and involvement of investment 
institutions such as the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB) will be required to facili-
tate and support market access to the re-
newable energy sectors of developing 
countries. Localization and local content 
rules are an issue here. 
3) Engage in the regional interconnec-
tivity of electric grids. Initiatives toward 
strengthening cross-border and regional 
power-grid connectivity have taken off across 
the Afro-Eur-Asian ellipse, most notably 
in Central Asia, the Gulf, and North Africa. 
These initiatives did not remain unnoticed 
by China, which, in pursuit of its own con-
nectivity strategy (GEIDCO and BRI), is 
rapidly building up its presence as a major 
investor and norm- and standard-setter. To 
ensure that power-grid connectivity in these 
regions is being pursued in a way that is 
conducive to the stability of these coun-
tries, their sustainable development, and 
the achievement of the Paris climate goals, 
the EU’s energy diplomacy must refocus 
regional multilateral energy dialogues as 
well as bilateral dialogues with key poten-
tial electricity hubs (Saudi Arabia, Uzbeki-
stan, Egypt, Morocco). The focus of the EU’s 
action should be on technical and regulato-
ry support, but it should also consider the 
possibility of financial support for invest-
ments in physical interconnections via EIB 
and European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. In this sense, the EU’s energy 
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diplomacy should frame these dialogues as 
a substantial part of the EU’s connectivity 
strategy and of regional initiatives such as 
the Eastern Partnership and the new Central 
Asia Strategy, and it should upgrade efforts 
with the Mediterranean neighborhood. For 
instance, initiatives such as Green Central 
Asia are relevant first steps to engage coun-
tries in a dialogue on climate change, but 
without a more solid focus on regional 
energy and electricity-grid integration, it will 
scarcely have an impact. The EU should also 
scale-up the level of institutional coopera-
tion with the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
4) Advance the global outreach of the 
Green Deal and the targets of the Paris 
Agreement. Given the abundance of alter-
native visions and approaches to the issue 
of climate change (e.g., those of China and 
the current US administration), as well as 
widespread climate change skepticism 
among the countries relevant to the EU’s 
energy diplomacy (aside from, perhaps, 
Morocco, Egypt, India, and the UAE), the 
EU’s usual normative approach to spread-
ing its climate agenda might be less futile. 
The EU will need to change its narrative 
and mitigate its approach. What will secure 
these partners over the long term is taking 
a “bypass” through new partnerships on 
sustainable economic growth, fighting local 
pollution, and promoting green financing, 
electrification, and integrated energy sys-
tems rather than directly demanding a 
decrease in CO2 emissions or phasing out 
coal. 
5) Strengthening multilateral and 
regional governance mechanisms. Multi- 
and plurilateral governance platforms –on 
the global level – are needed to address the 
systemic challenges that are emerging along 
with the energy transition(s). The EU has 
to further contribute toward strengthening 
the mandate of the existing institutions – 
most notably the United Nations Sustain-
able Energy for All, the International Energy 
Agency, IRENA, the International Partner-
ship for Energy Efficiency Cooperation, 
and the Energy Charter Modernization Pro-
cess – and push for cooperation on energy 
transition(s) within the G-formats. Yet, as 
the Sino-US rivalry, nationalist rhetoric, and 
fragmentation of energy markets escalate, 
the G20 becomes less functional. Against 
the backdrop of regional fragmentation and 
competition over spheres of influence, it is 
equally important for the EU to intensify 
regional cooperation schemes. New regional 
governance mechanisms must be established 
or upgraded and a clear agenda defined. In 
this sense, the EU should consult with the 
partner countries – ideally starting with the 
12 anchor partners of the Afro-Eur-Asian 
ellipse that have been identified – as to 
how to continue and reinforce constructive 
dialogue on the most contingent issues, 
such as transit, power grid connectivity, in-
vestment, intellectual property rights pro-
tection, clean energy technology transfer, 
cybersecurity of power systems, etc. A logi-
cal first step might be to bring together 
relevant working groups within the EU and 
the national institutions of these (groups of) 
countries as well as national regulatory 
authorities and representatives working for 
companies that provide critical infrastruc-
ture. 
Finally, and most importantly, the EU’s 
new energy diplomacy must be equipped 
with one essential feature – strategic pa-
tience. Without giving up its own strategic 
interests and values, the EU must neverthe-
less take into account the asynchrony of 
developments in its own energy market and 
system and those of the partner countries. 
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